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ABSTRACT
Researching administrative history is problematical. A trail of authoritative documents is
often hard to find; and useful summaries can be difficult to organise, especially if source
material is in paper formats in geographically dispersed locations. In the absence of
documents, the reasons for particular decisions and the rationale underpinning particular
policies can be confounded as key personnel advance in their professions and retire. The
rationale for past decisions may be lost for practical purposes; and if an organisation’s
memory of events is diminished, its learning through experience is also diminished.
Publishing this document tries to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort by other
researchers that need to venture into how policies of charging for public sector information
have been justified. The author compiled this work within a somewhat limited time period
and the work does not pretend to be a complete or comprehensive analysis of the issues.
A significant part of the role of government is to provide a framework of legally-enforceable
rights and obligations that can support individuals and non-government organisations in
their lawful activities. Accordingly, claims that governments should be more ‘business-like’
need careful scrutiny. A significant supply of goods and services occurs as non-market
activity where neither benefits nor costs are quantified within conventional accounting
systems or in terms of money. Where a government decides to provide information as a
service; and information from land registries is archetypical, the transactions occur as a
political decision made under a direct or a clearly delegated authority of a parliament with
the requisite constitutional powers. This is not a market transaction and the language of
the market confuses attempts to describe a number of aspects of how governments
allocate resources.
Cost recovery can be construed as an aspect of taxation that is a sole prerogative of a
parliament. The issues are fundamental to political constitutions; but they become more
complicated where states cede some taxing powers to a central government as part of a
federal system. Nor should the absence of markets be construed necessarily as ‘market
failure’ or even ‘government failure’. The absence is often attributable to particular
technical, economic and political constraints that preclude the operation of markets.
Arguably, greater care is needed in distinguishing between the polity and markets in
raising revenues and allocating resources; and that needs to start by removing unhelpful
references to ‘business’ in the context of government decision-making.
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1 GOVERNMENTS AND TAXATION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
In a 2001 report entitled Cost recovery by government agencies, Australia’s Productivity
Commission described cost recovery as:
A system of fees and specific purpose taxes used by government agencies to recoup some or
all of the costs of particular government activities.1
The Commission saw the question of cost recovery as an aspect of taxation but its remit
was to look more particularly at the role of the Commonwealth. The difficulty for States is
that in improving services that reduce costs to business, any consequential increases in
income to firms and individuals reflect as increased revenue available to the
Commonwealth in income taxation. Accordingly, questions of regulatory reform also
depend on the kinds of agreements that can be reached between the Commonwealth and
States in matters of finance as well as matters of regulation.
1.1.1 Transitioning from colonial self government to federalism
Political wrangling over the raising of taxes is as old as government itself. King Edward 1
summonsed the so-called Model Parliament in 1295,2 with the words quod omnes langit
ab omnibus approbetur - ‘what concerns all should be approved by all’.3 This led to the
formation of the House of Commons as a more representative assembly than had met
previously to sound out taxpayer reactions to the king’s revenue-raising proposals. In
1297, representatives agreed to reaffirm Magna Carta and a Charter of the Forests in a
new statute known as the Confirmation of the Charters.4 Adams summarises the
constitutional significance of the 1297 statute as follows:
There can be no question but that the men who framed this document intended to cover all
forms of taxation, except the feudal dues, and believed they had done so. And in the future
whenever this issue was squarely raised this was the interpretation placed upon the principle.
From this date on it was never called in question, by any English king. Successive kings might
try to avoid its effect by inventing new forms of revenue to which they could say it did not apply
or by unwarranted extensions of old revenues, but from 1297 it was definitely established as a
fundamental law of the constitution that the king was dependent for his revenue upon a previous
grant. It is in the form given it in the Confirmation that this principle becomes the foundation of
the power of parliament in the fourteenth century and ultimately of the whole constitution.5
British colonies were given considerable autonomy under their various charters to deal
with financial matters in the local government of their respective colonies. Colonial
governors had a vice-regal status and the main sources of government revenue were in
rentals of Crown lands and various import duties. However, the British Government
passed the Stamp Act of 1765 requiring citizens in Britain’s North American colonies to
1 Productivity Commission, Cost recovery by government agencies, Part 2 – Proposed information agency
guidelines, Report No.15, Australian Government: Canberra ACT, 16 August 2001, p.iii, accessed at URL
<http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/36882/costrecovery2.pdf>
2 Michael L Nash, ‘Crown, woolsack and mace: The model parliament of 1295’, Contemporary Review, Vol.267
Issue 1558, November 1995, pp.237-241
3 George Burton Adams, Constitutional history of England, revised by Robert L Schuyler, London: Jonathon Cape,
1934, p.186 – this Roman maxim was included in the writs that summonsed taxpayer representatives to the
parliament.
4 Confirmation of the Charters 1297, 25 Edw.1, c.6, granted by Edward 1 on 5 November 1297 – text reproduced in
‘Medieval Sourcebook: Confirmation of the Charters, 1297’, Internet Medieval Sourcebook, Fordham University
Center for Medieval Studies, accessed at URL <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/conf-charters.html> on 3
April 2008
5 Adams, Constitutional history of England, p.191
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pay duties, ostensibly to fund a war effort by the British government where the colonists
were said to be beneficiaries. Widespread civil disobedience followed, and the attitude of
colonists was popularised in the political slogan of ‘no taxation without representation’.
Ultimately, the breakdown of understandings about financial matters led to the American
Declaration of Independence of 1776 and a revolutionary war (1775-1783).
The arrival of a First Fleet of convict ships in New South Wales in 1788 marked the
beginning of permanent European settlement on the Australian continent. In effect, the
new convict settlement was a British penitentiary; and its remoteness from the seat of
government in England posed particular problems of law enforcement and accountability.
Requirements for regular reporting to the home government in England under its system of
ministerial responsibility ensured that voluminous historical records were generated
concerning the convict period. The early records are mainly correspondence and
dispatches between successive colonial governors and successive ministers and
secretaries to these ministers.
The political slogan of ‘no taxation without representation’ was politically sensitive in the
American colonies prior to its unilateral declaration of independence in 1776. The slogan
reappeared in New South Wales as the colony grew out of its status as an extended
penitentiary of England. Over time, the community began to include emancipated convicts,
free immigrants and their free-born offspring.6 The New South Wales governor was first
required to appoint a legislative council in 1823 and seek advice on the making of laws for
the colony. A public meeting held on 28 January 1827 led to a petition to the King, the
Lords and the Commons seeking trial by jury and taxation by a representative assembly.7
Concerns about the numbers of people available, but successive steps were taken over
time towards forming a bicameral legislature based on the Westminster model in 1856.
Thus the colonies moved from first steps towards a governor acting on the advice of an
appointed legislative council in 1823 towards a representative government based on a
property franchise in 1856.
The settlement of South Australia and various settlements in New Zealand owe much to
ideas of systematic colonisation along lines advocated by Edward Gibbon Wakefield.
These policies changed the whole question of development. Grants of land were no longer
free; attempts to charge for land purchase were met with a significant movement towards
squatting by graziers; and where land sales did take place, the proceeds were directed
towards assisted immigration of workers – mainly from Britain.
A number of technological breakthroughs changed the of economic development in the
1800s. Steam navigation at sea, steam locomotion on land; and Morse Code and
telegraphy were especially noteworthy. They provided faster inter-colonial and
international transport and communication. The moves also underpinned a period of
intense nationalism in advanced countries; and influenced moves to an Australian
federation of former colonies.
After federation in 1901, the States retained responsibility for land settlement, except in
Commonwealth Territories. The Commonwealth acquired responsibilities for immigration.
6 A C V Melbourne, Early constitutional development in Australia: New South Wales 1788-1856; Queensland 1859-
1922, ed and intr by R B Joyce, St Lucia QLD: University of Queensland Press, 1963.
7 Melbourne, p.135 citing Commons Journals, Vol.85, 1828, p.247
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This severed a former association between land and immigration policies of the former
colonies.
Commonwealth responsibilities for mapping became clearer over time to meet needs of
national defence, post war resettlement of ex-service personnel and post-war construction;
interstate transportation — in national highways, charting of territorial waters and
aeronautical charting. Attempts at a national approach to facilitate mapping centred mainly
on mapping for defence purposes. Some personalities wanted to follow the UK’s Ordnance
Survey model; but a measure of interstate cooperation was eventually achieved through a
National Mapping approach directed towards national development.8
1.1.2 Federal-State financial relations
Since 1901, a combination of historical circumstances and judicial interpretation has
determined how revenues can be raised and appropriated by Commonwealth, State and
Territory governments within the framework provided by the Australian Constitution. Under
the Constitution, the Australian government has a largely unqualified legislative power to
raise taxes.9 In contrast, the Constitution prevented the States from raising revenue from
customs and excise; and it became an exclusive source of Commonwealth revenue after
phasing out of transitional arrangements in 1910.10 World War 1 increased the
Commonwealth government’s need to raise revenues and appropriate expenditures. After
1915, the Commonwealth government relied increasingly on income taxes, effectively
adding to an existing burden of State income taxes.
In addition to its claims to an increasing share of income taxation, the Commonwealth
borrowed heavily to finance its war effort. Redeeming war loans after 1919 became a
programme in itself with States heavily involved in resettling returned servicemen and
achieving post-war reconstruction. In 1923, Commonwealth and State government made
joint arrangements for income tax collection. This saved some collection costs; but the
different principles and rates for assessment in the different jurisdictions added to its
complexity.11
A premiers’ conference of May 1923 agreed to form a voluntary Loan Council to
coordinate the timing of debt issues and deal with other matters such as interest rates on
issues of securities.12 A Commonwealth-State financial agreement of 1927 — approved by
a referendum in 1928 to become part of the Constitution in 1929 — allowed creation of an
Australian Loan Council.13 The 1927 Financial Agreement was amended in 1934, 1944,
1966, 1976 and 1994.14 In 1977, the Australian Loan Council was seen as providing a
8 John D Lines, Australia on paper: the story of Australian mapping, Box Hill VIC: Fortune Publications, 1992. The
history of these developments and their transition into ANZLIC (the Australia and New Zealand Land Information
Council): the ICSM (the Intergovernmental Committee on Surveying and Mapping); and the PSMA (the Public
Sector Mapping Authority) is beyond the scope of this report.
9 ibid., s51(ii)
10 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, s.87 – now otiose
11 Geoffrey Sawyer, The Australian Constitution, An Australian Information Service Publication, Canberra ACT:
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1975, p.91
12 Richard Webb, ‘The Australian Loan Council’, Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Library, Research Note No.
43 2001-02, 18 June 2002, accessed at URL <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/Pubs/rn/2001-02/02rn43.htm> on 27
April 2008
13 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, s.105A
14 The Schedule to the Financial Agreement Act 1994 (Cth) sets out the historical sequence of prior agreements as
a preamble to the agreement of 25 February 1994.
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substantial coordination of overall public sector borrowing that is unique among federal
systems.15 In 1990, Saunders argued differently:
… very extensive borrowings are undertaken outside the Financial Agreement, by central
borrowing agencies established by each state, which for practical purposes constitute
borrowings by the states themselves. The total program, presently called the global limits, is
formally acceded to by the Loan Council, although this is not a power conferred on it under the
agreement.16
A uniform income tax scheme began operating in Australia on 1 July 1942. The timing
coincided with a total commitment to Australia’s defence during World War 2. Initially, the
scheme was to exist until one year after the War, with tax reimbursements to the States
under a constitutional provision that ‘permits the Commonwealth to grant financial
assistance to any State on such terms and conditions as the Parliament thinks fit’.17 A
Premiers’ conference in January 1946 was told that the Commonwealth intended to
continue the uniform income tax scheme indefinitely. Subject to the States agreeing not to
re-enter the income tax field, the States were offered tax reimbursement grants on a
formula basis. With controls over loan raisings and no access to income tax or customs
and excise revenues, the States were left with little alternative but to devise new forms of
taxation.18
Issues of macroeconomic policy were not recognised as such until economic theorists
began trying to explain causes of the Great Depression. The Depression followed the
Great Crash of 1929 and persisted through the 1930s.19 At the time, governments had little
understanding of what could be done by way of effective remedial action. However, the
community loses if people who could do socially beneficial work become unemployed; and
the position of the unemployed becomes tenuous if they cannot obtain the things they
need for their own sustenance. Historical accounts over centuries have shown that
breakdowns of law and order are possible if people adversely affected by government
decisions resort to riotous behaviour to express their frustrations and anger about their
unemployment.
In Australia, the main instruments of macroeconomic policy included significant controls
over taxation, public sector expenditure and the monetary system. These controls were
mainly within the legislative responsibilities of the Commonwealth government. However,
control over microeconomic reform has depended on intergovernmental agreement. The
aim was to meet Australia’s obligation as a member of the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) to institute national policies to reduce distortions in market prices. The effect of
these constitutional and other changes placed the principal means for implementing
economic policy within the control of the Commonwealth government.
Members of the Council of Australian Governments have found common purpose about
seeking improved productivity through their mutual implementation of competition policy.
15 W R C Jay, ‘The Australian Loan Council’, Publius, Vol.7 No.3, Federalism in Australia: Current trends, Summer
1977, p.117
16 Cheryl A. Saunders, ‘Government borrowing in Australia’, Publius, Vol.20 No.4 Federalism in Australia, Autumn
1990, p.41
17 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, s.96
18 Denis James, ‘Commonwealth assistance to the States since 1976’, Background Paper 5 of 1997-98, Economics,
Commerce and Industrial Relations Group, Parliamentary Library, Parliament House, 20 October 1997, accessed
at URL http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bp/1997-98/98bp05.htm on 27 April 2008
19 John Kenneth Galbraith, The Great Crash 1929, first published 1954, republished with a new introduction,  Boston
MA: Mariner; Houghton Mifflin, 1997
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Productivity is likely to improve if State governments forego income from cost recovery on
public sector information to obtain increases in net social benefits through its increased
use for beneficial purposes. A first round of effects may be to enhance profits and returns
to the Commonwealth through increases in income tax revenues. In other words,
productivity improvements initiated by the States may reduce their revenues while at the
same time increasing revenues to the Commonwealth. Seemingly, efficiency and
accountability issues of all governments become inextricably interwoven.
This increases the need for trying to understand how these processes may improve
efficiency in collecting taxes, performing government functions and providing
accountability.
1.1.3 Australia and New Zealand
The Australian colonies and New Zealand developed historically as separate legal entities;
but they shared many attitudes and values derived from their common British heritage.
Representatives from New Zealand participated in National Australasian Conventions of
the 1890s,20 but New Zealand did not join in an Australasian federation.21 However,
Australia and New Zealand had a common concern with territorial defence. Their military
forces acted in unison as the Australia and New Zealand Army Corps in a British inspired
Dardanelles campaign in 1915. This began an ANZAC tradition and gave both countries
an entitlement to representation as independent dominions of Britain; as signatories of the
1919 Treaty of Versailles; and as members of a League of Nations.22
A number of agreements recognise a special relationship between Australia and New
Zealand. They include the 1966 New Zealand Australia Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); a
1973 free travel agreement; and a 1983 Closer Economic Relations trade agreement that
built on the previous agreements. Following the adoption of competition policy in Australia,
governments in Australia and New Zealand entered into a Trans-Tasman Mutual
Recognition Agreement in June 1996. This agreement implements mutual recognition
principles applying to sale of goods and registration of occupations; and aims to remove
regulatory barriers and facilitate trade in goods and services.23
Australia played a leading role in the formation of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation
(APEC) in 1989. APEC acts as a forum for Pacific Rim countries in encouraging non-
discriminatory trade liberalisation. Some members of APEC are also members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the agenda of both APEC and
ASEAN has recently extended beyond issues of trade to include matters such as climate
change.24
20 Parliament of Australia, Parlinfo Web, ‘Records of the Australasian Federal Conventions of the 1890's’, accesed
at URL <http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/pubs/records.htm>
21 Geoffrey Sawyer, The Australian Constitution, Australian Government Publishing Service: Canbera ACT, 1975,
p.18
22 Yale Law School, ‘The Versailles Treaty’, 28 June 1919, Avalon Project — documents in law, history and
diplomacy, accessed at URL <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/parti.asp>
23 Arrangement between the Australian parties and New Zealand relating to Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition,
signed 9-14 June 1996, accessed online at URL <http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/new_zealand/ttmra.pdf>
24 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) — Overview”, Australian
Government, accessed online at URL <http://www.dfat.gov.au/apec/apec_overview.html> on 9 December 2008
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In most jurisdictions, the management and use of information dissected under headings of
place and time tends to emphasise an increasing interest in emerging surveying and
mapping technology. This technology is a subset of a more broadly based information and
communications technology. Moreover, small scale mapping becomes necessary to
achieve coordination across the boundaries of local, regional, state and national
boundaries.25 Small scale mapping requires high level organisation to obtain
standardisation and cooperation across jurisdictional boundaries. As a consequence,
innovative management of spatial information tends to play a leading role in the more
general management and use of information. This has tended to place questions of
production; access; pricing; licensing; and disseminating spatial information at the forefront
of a more general debate about cost recovery for government information products in
Australia and overseas.
A federal system of government provides a measure of decentralisation in responding to
local issues, but also poses particular problems of coordination across the borders of its
member states. The outcome is that member states tend to compete as rivals in furthering
the economic development within their borders; and cooperate in activities that promote
provision of government services and trade across their borders.26
The Australian Constitution gives the Commonwealth a few exclusive legislative powers,
but Commonwealth and State governments have concurrent powers on a variety of
matters including taxation. Direct conflict in concurrent lawmaking is resolved in favour of
the Commonwealth, to the extent of the inconsistency.27 The effect has been for financial
power to gravitate towards the central government, especially to deal with international
aspects of government loan raising and national defence.28 As a consequence, overall
government financing in Australia has required particular cooperation in federal and state
financial arrangements. The Constitution also gives the Commonwealth an international
identity that allows it to enter into international agreements and treaties. Compliance with
some treaty obligations and international agreements often requires substantial
cooperation and mutually supportive legislation between the Commonwealth and States.
Examples include conventions relating to human rights and the environment; and
membership of the World Trade Organisation.29
1.2 COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENTS (COAG)
An Australian Council of Australian Governments (COAG) became a new vehicle for
cooperation between federal, state, territory and local governments when it met for the first
25 A mapping scale of say 1:500,000 means that 1 centimetre on the map represents 5000 metres on the ground
whereas mapping at 1:500 means that 1 centimetre on the map represents 5 metres on the ground. The smaller
scale of 1:500,000 shows a larger physical area on a single page than the larger scale of 1:500.
26 Productivity Commission, Productive reform in a federal system, Proceedings of a round table conference held in
Canberra on 27-28 October 2005, Australian Government: Canberra ACT, 2006 – the proceedings deal at length
with economic issues inherent in the Australia’s federal system. Documents obtained at URL
<http://www.pc.gov.au/research/confproc/productivereform> accessed 14 January 2008
27 Australian Constitution, s.109
28 Australian Constitution, s.105 – s.105A added after a Referenda on 13 April 1910 allowed Commonwealth
takeover of State debts; 17 November 1928 formalised the position of the Loan Council
29 Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), Marrakesh, 15 April 1994,
Entry into force for Australia and generally: 1 January 1995, Australian Treaty Series 1995 No.8, accessed at URL
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1995/8.html> on 14 January 2008
An overview of WTO documents appears as ‘WTO legal texts’
accessed at  URL <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm> on 15 January 2008
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time on 7 December 1992.30 COAG replaced previous systems of premiers’ conferences
and Special Premier’s Conferences. However, it included Territory Governments and a
representative from the Australian Association of Local Governments – being a part of
Australian government that had been previously excluded. While COAG developed
protocols for meetings between heads of government on a range of issues other than
financial arrangements, these protocols were also used in ministerial councils where
ministers from Australian governments meet to discuss issues that are common to their
portfolios.31 In some instances, membership of ministerial councils extends to New
Zealand and other nearby Pacific nations.
1.3 NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY
A meeting of Premiers and Chief Ministers endorsed the need for a competition policy on
21-22 November 1991.32 This was given effect when Prime Minster Keating announced
the establishment of an Independent Committee of Inquiry into National Competition Policy
on 4 October 1992.33 This Committee delivered its Report - generally known as the Hilmer
Report - to the heads of the nine Australian Governments on 24 August 1993.34 COAG
adopted the Hilmer recommendations in principle on 25 February 1994;35 and entered into
an agreement to implement the National Competition Policy and related reforms on 11
April 1995.36
The National Competition Policy package required the Commonwealth Parliament to pass
a Competition Policy Reform Bill 1995; and for Commonwealth, State and Territory
Governments to enter into:
 a Competition Principles Agreement;
 a Conduct Code Agreement; and
 an Implementation Agreement – an Agreement to Implement the National Competition
Policy and Related Reforms.37
30 Council of Australian Governments, ‘Council of Australian Government’s Communique 7 December 1992’,
available online at URL <http://www.coag.gov.au/meetings/071292/index.htm> accessed on 9 January 2008
Joanne Scott, Ross Laurie, Bronwyn Stevens and Patrick Weller, The engine room of government: the
Queensland Premier’s Department 1859-2001, St Lucia QLD: University of Queensland Press, 2001, pp.407-408
31 Council of Australian Governments, ‘Ministerial Councils’,
available online at http://www.coag.gov.au/ministerial_councils.htm accessed on 9 January 2008
32 Queensland Department of Premier and Cabinet, Leaders' Forum Communique - 21-22 November 1991 –
Adelaide, available online at URL
<http://www.premiers.qld.gov.au/policy/intergovt/coagmincncl/Communiques/Leaders_Forums/pre2000/2122_No
vember_1991/>
33 Statement by the Prime Minister, the Hon P J Keating, ‘National Competition Policy Review’, 4 October 1992,
accessed at <http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/repository1/media/pressrel/ln3460.pdf>
34 Frederick G Hilmer (Chair), Mark Rayner and Geoffrey Taperell, National Competition Policy Review, Australian
Government Publishing Service: Canberra ACT, 1993. Letter of transmittal dated 25 August 1993 reproduced as
pp.iii-iv
accessed at
35 Council of Australian Governments, ‘Council of Australian Government’s Communiqué 25 February 1994’,
available online at URL <http://www.coag.gov.au/meetings/250294/index.htm> accessed on 9 January 2008
36 ‘Council of Australian Governments' Meeting 11 April 1995’, accessed at URL
<http://www.coag.gov.au/meetings/110495/index.htm> on 14 January 2008
John Kain, Indra Kuruppu and Rowena Billing, ‘Australia's National Competition Policy: Its Evolution and
Operation’, E-Brief, Australian Parliamentary Library, published June 2001; updated 3 June 2003,
<http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/econ/ncp_ebrief.htm> accessed on 9 January 2008
37 These agreements are reproduced by the National Competition Council as Part 1 in Compendium of National
Competition Policy Agreements, 2nd edn.
accessed at <http://www.ncc.gov.au/pdf/PIAg-001.pdf>
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The Competition Principles Agreement set out obligations in the areas of prices
oversight of State and Territory government business enterprises (in clause 2); competitive
neutrality (in clause 3); structural reform of public monopolies (in clause 4) and legislation
review and reform (in clause 5). Reforms were to apply to local government (in clause 7).
The Agreement set out a (non-exhaustive) list of 'public interest' factors that governments
should consider when assessing the costs and benefits of a particular policy or course of
action (sub-clause 1(3)); and established arrangements for access by third parties to
services provided by significant infrastructure facilities (in clause 6 and in Part IIIA of the
Trade Practices Act as amended).
The Competition Principles Agreement required State and Territory Governments to bring
their business activities within the purview of Part IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
Part IV deals with restrictive trade practices. As an example, the Queensland government
enacted the Competition Policy Reform (Queensland) Act 1996 to establish a Queensland
Competition Code.38 Other States and Territories have similar competition codes. These
codes are administered uniformly by the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (ACCC) as though they were Commonwealth law.39
The Conduct Code Agreement committed State and Territory governments to extending
the prohibitions against anti-competitive behaviour in the Trade Practices Act to virtually all
businesses in Australia. It also requires each government to notify the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission when it enacts legislation that relies on section
51 of the Trade Practices Act. Section 51 enables State and Territory Governments to
exempt conduct from the prohibitions against anti-competitive behaviour as set out in Part
IV of the Trade Practices Act.
The Implementation Agreement set out reform obligations covering national markets in
electricity and gas, water reform and national road transport regulations; and provided for
payments by the Commonwealth to the States and Territories where they achieve
satisfactory progress with the implementation of the National Competition Policy and
related reforms.
As a consequence of National Competition Policy, government agencies need to consider
the extent to which competition ought to be permitted or encouraged in meeting the
purposes of government. The borderline between non-contestable and contestable areas
of production becomes apparent
1.4 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP
Promoting free trade as a means of improving human well-being gained a renewed
impetus in the aftermath of World War 2. The failure to maintain peace between 1919 and
1939 was seen as attributable, at least in part, to restrictive trade practices and ‘beggar-
thy-neighbour’ attitudes that followed the onset of the Great Depression. The 1944
negotiations at Bretton Woods envisaged an International Monetary Fund (IMF), an
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and an International Trade
38 Competition Policy Reform (Queensland) Act 1996, s.4
39 in 1995, the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s.6A established the ACCC to administer the Trade Practices Act
1974 and other acts
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Organization (ITO).40 While the IMF and the IBRD survived, attempts at establishing an
ITO failed.41 A General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) emerged as a multilateral
agreement among 23 participating nations at Geneva in 1947.42
The GATT operated in practice by attempting to reduce barriers to trade through
successive rounds of negotiations. The seventh round — the 1986-94 Uruguay Round of
negotiations — ended with an agreement at a ministerial council in Marrakesh on 15 April
1994 to form the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The WTO commenced on 1 January
1995 as the legal and institutional foundation for a new global trading system. The aims
were to reduce trade barriers, liberalise trade, and reduce instances of price
discrimination. Establishment of Australia’s National Competition Policy occurred at much
the same time and it was consistent with Australia’s joining of the WTO.
The documentation relating to WTO membership is extensive. An Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is set out as Annexure 1C to the
Marrakesh Agreement. The TRIPS Agreement requires WTO members to adopt particular
minimum standards regarding intellectual property.43
Negotiations on the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA were
finalised in February 2004 after 11 months of negotiations. The final text of the AUSFTA
was signed in Washington DC on 18 May 2004 and entered into force on January 1,
2005.44
World Trade depends on non-market activity performed by national and international
organisations that are both non-government and not-for-profit. The socio-economic impact
of these organisations resides largely in reach of their influence. The Social and Economic
Council of the United Nations recognises some 3051 non-government organisations as
having and official consultative status which says something about their influence.45 The
socio-economic importance of these organisations is evident in their capacity to influence
particular issues as political agenda items and public policy. These influences operate at
global, national, state and local levels in matters such as socio-economic development,
human rights and the environment.
1.5 INTERGOVERNMENTAL INITIATIVES – SPATIAL INFORMATION
Surveying and mapping provides spatial information to organise and sustain occupation
and use of territory; to organise various forms of transportation; and to support various
sciences concerned with study of the natural and built environment and socio-economic
40 The IBRD is the founding institution of the World Bank that is now part of the World Bank Group. This issue is
discussed also in Section 4.5.2.1 — ‘Industry regulation in Australia’.
41 Douglas A Irwin, ‘The GATT's contribution to economic recovery in post-war Western Europe’, Chapter 5 —
pp.127-150 in Europe's postwar recovery, ed by Barry Eichengreen, Studies in macroeconomic history series,
Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
42 ibid., pp.131-133
43 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO, 3rd edn, previously published in September 2003 as Trading
into the future, Geneva: WTO, 2007
accessed online at URL http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf
44 Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(DFAT), documentation accessible through URL http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us_fta/final-
text/index.html
45 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ‘NGO related questions and answers’, accessed at
URL <http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/> on 8 February 2008
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conditions. This organisation extends hierarchically through national, state, regional, local
territorial jurisdictions. It reaches down to the private land parcels of individual citizens and
the various public lands in roads, conservation areas and the like. The basic dissections of
time and place provide a basis for managing information generally. As a result,
governments need to confront issues in spatial information to manage practically all their
affairs.
In Australia, concerns escalated in the 1930s regarding mapping for national defence in
anticipation of war.46 Military mapping in Australia - and in theatres involving Australian
military forces - became part of parliamentary appropriations for defence expenditure. In
1945, the Australian prime minister obtained agreement from State premiers to formation
of a National Mapping Council to coordinate Commonwealth and State mapping.47 The
Council served needs for military mapping, post war reconstruction and more general
national development. However, increasing divergence between interests of military and
civilian bureaucracies and an absence of private sector involvement led to the Council
becoming increasingly irrelevant and voting for its own dissolution in November 1986.48
1.5.1 Australia New Zealand Land Information Council (ANZLIC)
The Australian Land Information Council (ALIC) was formed as an advisory body under an
agreement reached in 1986 between the Prime Minister and heads of State governments.
The Council was renamed as the Australia New Zealand Land Information Council
(ANZLIC) when New Zealand became a member in 1991.49 Seemingly, the hope was that
this new arrangement would overcome some shortcomings of the former National Mapping
Council. The new challenges were to recognise the increasing role of spatial data in
electronic formats as an aid to environmental management and in socio-economic
development.
ANZLIC does not have special legislation authorising its formation and operation; but
authority can be implied from the needs for efficient and effective government
administration within a federation. ANZLIC has managed to achieve consensus among its
members; and it does influence the consistency and coherence of various policies related
to the production and supply of ‘spatial information’ by government agencies in a technical
sense.50 However, this technical competence does not always extend to consistency or
even understanding of socio-economic circumstances. Since ANZLIC’s formation in 1986,
the term ‘spatial information’ has acquired usage as an umbrella term that includes ‘land
information’ and ‘geographic information’. Spatial information is a useful descriptor
whenever determining location becomes important to outcomes; and is therefore a key
ingredient of governance in government, commerce, science and other fields of human
endeavour.
46 Lawrence Fitzgerald, Lebanon to Labuan: a story of mapping by the Australian Army Corps World War II (1939-
1945), Melbourne VIC: J G Holmes, 1980, pp.vii-xii & 1-4. John D. Lines, Australia on paper: the story of
Australian mapping, Box Hill VIC: Fortune Publications, 1992, especially at Chapter 4, ‘Mapping between the wars
– the lean years’, pp.62-83.
47 Lines, Australia on paper, p.171. S E Reilly, The profession of surveying in Queensland, Brisbane QLD: Institution
of Surveyors Australia (Queensland Division), 1970, pp.67-68
48 Lines, Australia on paper, p.304
49 Renate Mason, ‘Developing Australian spatial data policies - existing practices and future strategies’, A thesis
submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of New South Wales,
2000, pp.8-9 & 30-31, accessed at URL <http://www.library.unsw.edu.au/~thesis/adt-NUN/uploads/approved/adt-
NUN20021106.165932/public/01front.pdf> on 14 January 2008
50 Australia New Zealand Land Information Council, ANZLIC Annual Report 2005-2006,
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ALIC and its successor in ANZLIC published a series of discussion papers entitled ‘Issues
in Land Information Management’.51 These papers included Data Custodianship/Trustee-
ship (April 1990); A General Guide to Copyright, Royalties and Data Use Agreements
(Executive Summary – March 1992); Charging for Land Information (April 1990); Access to
Government Land Information: Commercialisation or Public Benefit? (December 1990);
and Privacy, Confidentiality and Access to Information in Land Information Systems
(September 1992).
The December 1990 paper — entitled Access to government land information:
commercialisation or public benefit — canvassed economic issues arising from:
 pressure to increase government revenue from external sources;
 increasing attempts to apply user-pays principles to government services;
 requirements on economic efficiency grounds to more fully exploit underutilised
resources, and
 pressure from private sector organisations to gain access to valuable land information
held within government databases.52
In essence, the paper recognised the tension between two views:
 information is paid for to support its statutory purpose and any potential for re-use
should be made freely available to those who can make good use of it; or
 information is in the hands of a custodian who has a responsibility to maximise returns
to the agency.53
Viewed in terms of conventional microeconomic theory, the problem with the second
position is that the level of output consistent with maximising net private benefits to an
agency is less than what is socially optimal. Assumptions that underpin conventional
microeconomic theory suggest that buyers and sellers have ‘perfect information’ and this
information is, for the most part, exogenously determined. These assumptions and the
theory derived in using them are unable to provide much assistance where considerable
economic resources are involved in producing information and learning from it. Alternative
economic argument suggests that ideas about ‘optimising’, maximising’, ‘minimising’ and
‘equilibrium’ are out of place in an information economy with a capacity for monitoring,
learning and reappraisal. On thorough examination, some ideas about value and returns
on investment can reduce to absurdity. Accordingly, agencies need to revisit the purposes
for which they produce information to regain some perspective on whether their activities
can be regarded as both efficient and effective in economic terms.
In 1994, ANZLIC commissioned Price Waterhouse to prepare an Australian land and
geographic data infrastructure benefits study as part of its third strategic plan covering the
period from 1994 to 1997.54 Whether such an enquiry can be useful depends on the kind
51 Australia New Zealand Land Information Council, ‘Archived publications’, available online at
http://www.anzlic.org.au/publications_archive.html accessed on 6 January 2008
52 Australia and New Zealand Land Information Council (ANZLIC), Access to Government Land Information -
Commercialisation or Public Benefit?, Issues in Land Information Management Paper No.4, 1990,  p.1
accessed at URL <http://www.anzlic.org.au/get/2374980688.pdf>
53 ibid., p.3
54 Price Waterhouse, Economic Studies and Strategies Unit, Australian land and geographic data infrastructure
benefits study, Report prepared for the Australia New Zealand Land Information Council, February 1995,
accessed at URL <http://www.anzlic.org.au/pubinfo/2358011751.html>
16 TABLE OF CONTENTS - continued
of things that the principal asks — generally based on popular assumptions and
misconceptions — and the things that consultants decide to answer. In this case, the
terms of reference for the benefits study were to:
 examine and document the costs and benefits of the land and geographic data infrastructure
in Australia over the past 5 years;
 estimate the public and private sector benefits by industry segment for the next 10 years,
assuming that current levels of investment continue;
 identify actions that could be taken by the public sector and private sector in Australia to
increase the level of benefits over the next 10 years; and
 make recommendations on how jurisdictions within Australia can monitor benefits in a
nationally consistent manner.55
The Price Waterhouse study took place soon after release of the Hilmer Report into
national competition policy. This study further highlighted the need to distinguish between
public and private production of information in ways that satisfied requirements for efficient
and effective government.
In line with the recent Hilmer Report on National Competition Policy, data suppliers throughout
Australia must also consider the establishment of a framework for facilitating competition in data
supply and ensuring that users have access to critical or essential data on fair and reasonable
terms.56
The study recognised that attempts to avoid unnecessary duplication in spatial information
infrastructure led to ency towards natural monopoly in avoiding unnecessary duplication in
spatial information infrastructure.
Access rights and rules have been recognised clearly in recent National Competition Policy
reforms proposed as part of the Hilmer Review. While much of the focus of the Review has
been on the natural monopoly components of telecommunications and energy supply networks,
the same general principles enunciated by Hilmer may be applied to the provision of critical or
essential land and geographic information. To the extent that this data has natural monopoly
characteristics, access rights and rules may need to be introduced which are over and above
those articulated as part of existing ANZLIC policy.57
The report alluded to benefits attributable to spatial information. Generally, benefits are
multifaceted and derive from more efficient use of resources.
Extensive surveys conducted as part of the review revealed a benefit:cost ratio for data usage
of approximately 4:1. This indicates that for every dollar invested in producing land and
geographic data $4 of benefit was generated within the economy. For the period 1989-94, these
benefits were in the order of $4.5 billion.
…
Benefits took the form of improved business and strategic planning, increased productivity, the
development of new business opportunities, improved scheduling and co-ordination of
investment projects, and improvements in the utilisation, pricing, maintenance and disposal of
fixed assets. These benefits were distributed across a broad spectrum of economic activities
ranging from the operation of electricity, gas, and water utilities to the development of projects
involving agriculture, mining and environmental management.58
55 ibid., p.5
56 ibid., p.3
57 ibid., p.57
58 ibid., p.1
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The report claimed that the existing information infrastructure was substantially cheaper
than alternative arrangements:
Survey results also indicated that the existing infrastructure for supplying data had provided
information to users at a cost far lower than alternative methods. If this infrastructure had not
been in place, and users had been forced to meet their data requirements from other sources,
their costs would have been approximately 6 times higher. Over the past 5 years alone,
established infrastructure has saved users over $5 billion, much of which was re-invested to
generate additional economic activity. The results suggest that investment in infrastructure of
close to $1 billion since 1989 has been utilised effectively by data supplying agencies and has
led to important cost savings for industry.
ANZLIC issued a policy statement on spatial data management in April 1999. This policy
statement set out principles for the responsible management of spatial data as a critical
national resource; and commits all jurisdictions in Australia to cooperate in the
implementation of the Australian Spatial Data Infrastructure (ASDI). The policy applies to
all forms of fundamental spatial data; the collection, management and use of fundamental
spatial data in the national interest, whether application is at national, regional or local
levels; and the use of fundamental spatial data by governments, industry and the
community.
Currently, ANZLIC regards it as part of its remit to develop access and pricing policy for
spatial information. However, such a task is likely to extend beyond the directors and staff
lacks expertise within its own membership for such a task; and
Draft Principles
1. All sectors of the community should have easy, efficient and equitable access to
fundamental spatial data where technology, data formats, institutional arrangements,
location, costs and conditions do not inhibit its use.
2. The fundamental spatial data needed by all sectors of the community should be available
to support economic, environmental and social needs.
3. Governments should seek to maximise the net benefits to the community when
developing their spatial data access policies and pricing regimes.
4. Fundamental spatial data should be made available online through customer-focussed
portals, as one of a number of ways to meet community needs for equity of access.
5. Access arrangements should be geared to maximise the use of spatial data resources in
both public and private sectors and to encourage the development of an innovative and
competitive value-adding industry.
6. Access arrangements should recognise confidentiality, privacy, security and intellectual
property rights.
Implementation
1. The access principles will be made available on the ANZLIC website and comments
sought.
2. ANZLIC will place a summary of current access arrangements within each jurisdiction on
the website.
3. ANZLIC will develop a model spatial data access and pricing policy.
4. Jurisdictions will assess performance of their existing or draft policies against the model.
5. The policy will be used within the context of negotiations between government and the
private sector under the Action Agenda.
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1.5.2 Australian Spatial Consortium
ANZLIC and other industry organisations announced formation of an Australian Spatial
Consortium (ASC) in 2008.59 As part of this announcement, the ASC established a website
and published a statement entitled ‘Development of strategic directions’ with the following
purpose in mind:
The purpose of this document is to provide a progress report to the stakeholders of the
Australian spatial information community on the identification of significant issues that will help
the Steering Committee of the Australian Spatial Consortium develop its strategic plan.60
The document reveals good intentions but unfortunately, it also reveals considerable
naivety on the broader functions of government and the socio-economic consequences
that are likely to be implicated.
1.5.3 PSMA Australia Limited
The ANZLIC vision of a national spatial information infrastructure led to formation of a
consortium of public sector mapping agencies in 1993. This consortium is now known as
PSMA Australia Limited - an unlisted public company wholly owned by the State, Territory
and Australian Governments. PSMA acts as a clearing house for government spatial
information across State and Territory borders.
In the 1980s, governments incurred costs in converting analogue maps and plans into
digital formats. Users saw these forms of data management as a means of improving
operational efficiency. On 31 January 1992, a meeting of Surveyors-General was held in
Canberra to discuss possible creation of a ‘national data set including the Digital Cadastral
Data Base (DCDB) and selected topographic data’.61 The meeting agreed:
 Government was to be the focus client group
 The consortium would be established through agreements
 Consideration would be given to include the private sector
 A board of management be established with members from each state or territory
 A non-operational coordinator and secretariat was required
 Sample data be provided to assess compatability
 A technical working party be established
 States’ ownership of data be confirmed
 Members to identify any likely additional costs.62
In responding to an advertised tender, PSMA Australia lodged a competitive expression of
interest with the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) on 1 May 1992. In July 1992, ABS
advised that PSMA would not be invited to tender as it had failed to address all of the ABS
requirements. Following technical and political negotiations that included an attempt to
gain support from a Land Ministers conference held in Darwin in September 1992, ABS
confirmed that PSMA Australia had been chosen to supply mapping information to ABS
subject to satisfactory contract negotiations; and a contract was signed on 8 June 1993.63
59 Warwick Watkins (Chair), Australian Spatial Consortium (ASC), ‘Setting the scene’, information accessed online
at URL <http://sasikala.ecampus.com.au/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Setting-the-scene.pdf>
60 Australian Spatial Consortium (ASC),‘Development of strategic directions’, 15 August 2008, information
accessible online at URL <http://bit.ly/ASCdirections>
61 PSMA Australia Limited, A concise history of PSMA Australia Limited: from collaboration to success, Griffith ACT,
PSMA Australia, first published in February 2006, revised version 2009, p.4
62 ibid.
63 ibid., p.5. The information is unclear but seemingly, the NSW government and the ABS acting on
behalf of the Australian Government were the contracting parties. The NSW government was a lead
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The ABS contract provided a total of $3.4 million to be paid in instalments till the beginning
of 1998.64 This allowed payment of PSMA’s direct costs in contract performance; and
contributed some $1.5 million to consortium members to upgrade particular datasets.65
An example of the PSMA approach to pricing appeared in a description of its
Administrative Boundaries Product.66 This product deals with boundaries established for
various purposes such as statistical and electoral boundaries arranged at various
hierarchical levels.  PSMA described its policy on pricing in the following terms:
The pricing model for PSMA Australia’s national datasets incorporates a range of variables that
need to be considered when determining pricing. As there is the potential for the pricing model
to be misinterpreted, it is PSMA Australia’s preference to discuss pricing on a case-by-case
basis.
In order for PSMA Australia to supply pricing information for its datasets, potential licensees will
need to be able to provide a description of the planned use(s) for the data.
As PSMA Australia is only a small team the preferred approach would be that this description is
provided in email form. From there the office can contact enquirers and commence more
detailed discussions.67
Elements of this policy give cause for concern.
 A negotiated price is apparently influenced by the supplier’s perceptions of value to an
intending user – a value that an intending user has no incentive to reveal.
 In attempting to appropriate surplus value that a buyer would be willing to pay over a
price that might be sustainable with price signalling under open market conditions, the
result is discriminatory pricing under circumstances that lack transparency.
 Although PSMA is ostensibly a private corporation, it is owned by governments and its
purported role is in value-adding through compiling information for sale using
fundamental data sets owned by governments. Moreover, it enjoys a tax exempt status.
This work might also be done by other private sector agencies. It is difficult to make
assessments about competitive neutrality where there is a lack of transparency. More
needs to be known about the extent to which its operations might be seen as anti-
competitive.
1.5.4 Commonwealth Spatial Data Committee
The Commonwealth Spatial Data Committee (CSDC) came into being in 1992 and was
replaced by the Office of Spatial Data Management in 2001. On its formation, CSDC’s
mission was to coordinate spatial data management within the Commonwealth
Government. Factors that were deemed to make this coordination necessary included:
agent for the PSMA consortium that may not have had legal authority to enter into contracts at that
stage.
64 ibid. The payment schedule was $1.4 million paid in 6 six-monthly payments commencing in July 1993; and $2
million paid in 4 six-monthly instalments commencing in July 1996.
65 Dan L Paull and Marni J Bower, ‘Spatially enabling Australia through collaboration and innovation’,
Photogrammetric Engineering and Remote Sensing, Vol.69 No.10, October 2003, accessed online at URL
<http://www.asprs.org/publications/pers/2003journal/october/2003_oct_1183-1190.pdf>
66 PSMA Australia Limited, PSMA Australia Administrative Boundaries Product Description, Version 1.1, Canberra
ACT: PSMA Ltd., 2006, accessed at URL <http://www.psma.com.au/file_download/19>
67 ibid., p.19, para.3.2,
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 the demands placed on spatial data by geographic information systems;
 the need to avoid duplication of spatial data collection and management;
 the need to combine spatial data sets;
 the need to form common approaches for issues such as data standards; distribution,
copyright, privacy and pricing; and
 the need for the Commonwealth to be represented on forums such as ANZLIC.68
In 1995, CSDC developed the Commonwealth Public Interest Spatial Data Transfer Policy.
Seemingly, this policy attempted to recover some or all of the average cost of distribution.
Where average costs exceed marginal costs – the output supplied to users of information
will be less than a notional social optimum given by marginal cost pricing.
1.5.5 Spatial information industry action agenda – 2000-2001
On 24 May 2000, the then Minister for Industry, Science and Resources - Senator Nick
Minchin - announced that his Department would assist the spatial information industry
through its Action Agenda program. The government approved the Spatial Information
Action Agenda on 27 August 2001;69 and launched it on 25 September 2001. The formal
implementation period ended in March 2004.70
The Action Agenda report — entitled Positioning for growth — identified five particular
goals as central to the future success of the spatial information industry, namely:
 Develop a joint policy framework;
 Improve data access and pricing;
 Increase effective research and development;
 Evaluate and reform education and skills formation; and
 Develop domestic and global markets.71
Positioning for growth identified the lack of a whole-of-government approach to access and
pricing of publicly funded spatial information as a key impediment to growth of the spatial
information industry.72 Accordingly, reform in this area was seen as a priority issue.73
Government policy on cost recovery has implications for data access and pricing as noted
above but also has wider implications for the spatial information industry. In particular, the
industry considers that the practice of setting targets that require agencies to recover a specific
proportion of total costs is forcing agencies such as CSIRO to compete directly with the private
sector and is limiting their ability to collaborate effectively.
68 CSDC 2000, (a reference to a now defunct website), cited in Mason, p.31
69 Spatial Information Industry Action Agenda Steering Group, Walter Mayr (Chair), Positioning for growth: spatial
information industry action agenda, Canberra ACT: Department for Industry, Science and Resources, 2001
Available at URL <http://www.crcsi.com.au/UPLOADS/PUBLICATIONS/PUBLICATION_310.pdf>
70 Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, Review of the implementation of the Spatial Information Industry
Action Agenda and the Spatial Data Access and Pricing Policy, Canberra ACT: Australian Government,
December 2004, s.2.1, p.3
71 Spatial Information Industry Action Agenda Steering Group, Walter Mayr (Chair), Positioning for growth, p.8
72 ibid., p.45
73 ibid., p.43 – Recommendation 6.7
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Accordingly, the industry strongly supports the findings and draft recommendations of the
Productivity Commission draft report into Cost Recovery by Commonwealth Government
agencies.74
The report recommended a joint development by government and industry of a common
approach to spatial data access, pricing and application of copyright policy in respect of
the licensing of spatial information which maximises the benefits to Australia.75
Reform of government pricing and access policies for the provision of spatial information
should be considered as priority issues. Any need for additional funding should be
considered in a Budget context.
This is probably the single most important government policy issue for the industry and is
discussed in detail in Chapter 6. Data is one of the primary factors of production for the
spatial industry and, as such, any constraint on the availability of data, either through
quantitative or legislative restrictions, or through the use of monopoly power in pricing,
reduces the industry’s profitability and ability to contribute to economic growth.
1.6 PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION COST RECOVERY REPORT - 2000-
2002
On 16 August 2000, the Assistant Treasurer asked the Productivity Commission to review
cost recovery arrangements of Australian Government regulatory, administrative and
information agencies - including fees charged under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA).76
The Commission produced two documents; the final report,77 and proposed information
agency guidelines,78 both dated 16 August 2001. The Commission paid particular mention
of basic constitutional issues. It recommended:
All cost recovery arrangements should have clear legal authority. Agencies should identify the most
appropriate authority for their charges and ensure that fees-for-service are not vulnerable to challenge as
amounting to taxation.79
The Commission also found:
There is currently a lack of transparency and accountability in many cost recovery arrangements. It is
difficult to identify from existing sources the overall level of cost recovery by Commonwealth regulatory and
information agencies. Publicly available data are incomplete and inconsistent, and the Department of
Finance and Administration is unable to identify cost recovery receipts separately from other revenue.
Moreover, at the individual agency level, it is difficult to establish the objectives, costing and revenue
raising of many cost recovery arrangements.
In a joint media statement of 14 March 2002, the Treasurer and the Minister for Finance
and Administration announced the release of the Commission's final report together with
74 ibid., p.38
75 ibid., p.43 – Recommendation 6.1
76 Rod Kemp, Assistant Treasurer, Terms of Reference, 16 August 2000, reproduced in Productivity Commission,
Cost recovery by Government agencies, Report No.15, Australian Government: Canberra ACT, 16 August 2001,
at pp.iv-v accessed at URL <http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/36877/costrecovery1.pdf>
77 ibid., in main report
78 Productivity Commission, Cost recovery by government agencies, Part 2 – Proposed information agency
guidelines, Report No.15, Australian Government: Canberra ACT, 16 August 2001,
accessed at URL <http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/36882/costrecovery2.pdf>
79 ibid., p.liii, Recommendation 3.1
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the government’s interim response to the report’s recommendations.80 Appendix A
contains a synopsis of the Commission’s recommendations and the government’s
responses.
1.7 INFORMATION ACCESS AND PRICING
1.7.1 Spatial data access and pricing – 2000-2002
As an adjunct to the Action Agenda, the Minster for Industry, Science and Resources also
wrote to other ministers on 19 July 2000 seeking support to establish an Interdepartmental
Committee on Spatial Data Access and Pricing.81 On 9 August 2000 the newly constituted
Interdepartmental Committee began its task of reporting to Cabinet on:
1. The policy to be adopted on the pricing of and access to spatial data held by the Commonwealth
that may be made available to other potential users;
2. The datasets to which the proposed policy should apply;
3. The set of principles to be adopted by the Commonwealth in the negotiation of spatial data transfer
arrangements with States and Territories;
4. The administrative arrangements to be adopted to implement, manage and maintain the proposed
policy and intergovernmental arrangements.82
Initially, the Interdepartmental Committee was to report to Cabinet in December 2000.
However, this completion date was postponed until June 2001 to allow a single Cabinet
submission to deal with both the Interdepartmental Committee report and the spatial
information industry Action Agenda.83 Government attitudes towards access and pricing of
spatial data had important implications for innovation within the spatial information
industry. However, completion of the Interdepartmental Committee report was deferred
when the government decided to refer the general matter of cost recovery for government
services to the Productivity Commission.84 On 25 September 2001, the Commonwealth
Government announced its new Policy for Spatial Data Access and Pricing. The
Productivity Commission’s report was completed on 16 August 2001, but not released
officially until 14 March 2002 pending preparation of the government’s response to the
report. 85
80 Senator Nick Minchin (Minister for Finance and Administration); and Peter Costello (Treasurer), Release of the
Productivity Commission Report on Cost Recovery by Government Agencies and the Government's interim
response to the report, Media release 11/02, 14 March 2002,
<http://www.financeminister.gov.au/media/2002/mr_1102_joint.html>
81 Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Spatial Data Access and Pricing (CICSDAP), A proposal for a
Commonwealth policy on spatial data access and pricing. Canberra ACT, Australian Government
Intergovernmental Committee on Spatial Data Access and Pricing, Secretariat, Mr Graham Baker, Policy &
Coordination, Australian Land Information Group (AUSLIG), June 2001, p.7
<http://www.osdm.gov.au/docs/Commonwealth_Policy_on_Spatial_Data_Access_and_Pricing.pdf>
82 ibid., p.1
83 ibid., p.2
84 Established under the Productivity Commission Act 1998 (Cth)
85 Senator Nick Minchin (Minister for Finance and Administration); and Peter Costello (Treasurer), Release of the
Productivity Commission Report on Cost Recovery by Government Agencies and the Government's interim
response to the report, Media release 11/02, 14 March 2002,
<http://www.financeminister.gov.au/media/2002/mr_1102_joint.html>
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The Interdepartmental Committee report of summarised its recommendations as follows:
The Interdepartmental Committee on Spatial Data Access and Pricing (the IDC) recommends
that the Commonwealth:
Provide fundamental spatial data free of charge over the Internet, and at no more than the
marginal cost of transfer for packaged products and full cost of transfer for customised services
without any copyright licence restrictions on commercial value-adding. Fundamental spatial
datasets, and their current and planned availability over the Internet, will be identified in a public
schedule.
Develop an Internet-based public access system, within the framework of the Australian Spatial
Data Infrastructure. Agencies will be responsible for maintaining their own data access and
management systems, but must comply with an agreed set of' standards which support the
Australian Spatial Data Directory and a single Commonwealth entry point. This system should
be developed to provide spatial content to all Commonwealth portals.
Negotiate a multilateral agreement with the States and Territories for access to spatial datasets
required for Commonwealth purposes. The agreement should provide for reciprocal pricing (free
over the Internet, marginal cost of transfer otherwise), but require Commonwealth agencies to
obtain the permission of State/Territory data custodians for any data transfer or licensing to a
third party.
Replace the Commonwealth Spatial Data Committee with a new administrative structure,
comprising an executive policy group, a management committee, and a new Office of' Spatial
Data Management. This structure will be responsible for managing the implementation of'the
new access and pricing policies.
Agencies will be able to commence implementation of the foregoing recommendations without
additional funding. However; the IDC notes that the economic and social benefits arising from
the recommendations will not be fully realised until the new coordination arrangements are fully
resourced and all Commonwealth fundamental spatial data are available over the Internet. The
IDC therefore further recommends that the Government.
Consider the costs and benefits of accelerating the accessibility of' fundamental spatial data
over the Internet in the context of the 2002 budget.86
On 25 September 2001, the Commonwealth Government announced its new Policy for
Spatial Data Access and Pricing. A full description of the Policy is provided in Appendix B.
1.7.2 Office of Spatial Data Management (OSDM)
Following a recommendation of the Interdepartmental Committee on Spatial Data Access
and Pricing, the Australian Government established an Office of Spatial Data Management
(OSDM) to coordinate spatial data management across Australian Government agencies.
The Terms of Reference (ToR) of the Commonwealth Spatial Data Policy Executive
require that the Executive will:
1.  Report annually to the Responsible Minister on implementation of the Policy including:
 changes to the Data Schedule in the period;
 changes to access and pricing arrangements in the period;
 the cost of data management in the period; for each dataset in Schedule, and against
the categories intra-Commonwealth, Commonwealth-State, Commonwealth-other
transfers:
86
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- revenue;
- units;
- uses, benefits and value.
2. Review and evaluate the efficacy of:
 the Data Schedule;
 the access and pricing arrangements;
 the arrangements for custodianship and sponsorship;
 the annual workplan; and
 the coordination arrangements
3. The Chair of the CSDPE will represent the Commonwealth on ANZLIC and the Group
will provide high-level input to the determination of the Commonwealth’s position in that
forum.
The Executive reported that in its first year of operation:
 Implementation of the Commonwealth’s Spatial Data Access and Pricing Policy in 2001-02,
led to dramatic reductions in the prices of datasets (in one agency, prices on some spatial
datasets fell from $25,000 to $99).
 Increased availability and decreased prices resulted in a substantial rise in the number of
datasets downloaded or sold. Commonwealth agencies reported distributing 75,310 copies
of fundamental spatial datasets and 673,725 copies of non-fundamental spatial data. In
addition, a substantial (but unknown) number of datasets were downloaded directly from
agency websites.
 Commonwealth agencies spent $273.5 million in 2001-02 on the management of
fundamental spatial datasets listed on the Data Schedule.
 A total of 44 datasets were identified as additions to the Data Schedule (a 50 percent
increase on the existing total), including datasets from six new custodian agencies.87.
1.7.3 Commonwealth cost recovery guidelines for information
agencies
The Productivity Commission Report on cost recovery included case studies on
‘information agencies’ in Appendix C of its main report. It also produced a Part 2:
Proposed information agency guidelines.88
Basically, the Commission recognised that some information could have ‘public good’
characteristics. This implied that significant positive externalities might be possible; and
the usual ‘free rider’ problem when a user-pays principle becomes unworkable in practice.
However, there is no reason to believe that a download of information is sufficient in itself
to lead inexorably to some socio-economic benefit.
87 Spatial Data Policy Executive, Annual Report 2001-2002, Canberra ACT: Commonwealth Spatial Data Policy
Executive; Department of Industry, Science and Resources, 2003.
88 Report No.15, 2001
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1.7.4 Australian Bureau of Statistics
The Productivity Commission’s report made special mention of the Australian Bureau of
Statistics (ABS) and the role of a statistical agency in a democratic society. ABS has made
significant steps in introducing a well coordinated policy on access, licensing and pricing of
its information.89
1.8 WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INITIATIVES
The following analysis traces some of the historical events leading to the Western
Australian initiative and the integration of a particular business model involving spatial
information into the Westminster system of government. Unfortunately, much of the
language surrounding the initiative is about markets; and confuses the things that
governments are specifically constituted to do with the things that non-government entities
are formally authorised to do by governments. In using terms such as ‘market’ and ‘client’,
discussions about policy cannot be carried out with sufficient distinctions related to
meaning. Consequence, ambiguity and misunderstanding are commonplace.
Under the Westminster system, the delivery of government services occurs by allocations
made under the direction of parliament. The processes of allocating resources in the
supply of information to various people are generally based on prices established by
command rather than on prices established in a market. Most Australian jurisdictions solve
their land registration and valuation issues in their own way; and it is each parliament’s
prerogative and duty to establish its regime of charges as it sees fit in balancing its budget.
Overall impressions are gleaned from reports, records of parliamentary proceedings and
informal discussion with people from Western Australia:
 The important legacy of intergovernmental cooperation through auspices of the Western
Australian Land Information System (WALIS) might have been lost through undue haste
in machinery of government changes.
 The formation of a Western Australia Land Information Authority as a separate statutory
authority preserved a focus on land information and its role across government; and
with the public. The enabling legislation sets out the constitutional issues for a statutory
trading entity with particular clarity and places considerable emphasis of oversight by
the responsible minister.
 The provision of services from land registration and land valuation authorities occurs in
other jurisdictions as statutory duties; but there is often difficulty in establishing a whole
of government approach where it is important to production and use of government
information that relies on spatial information to identify time and place.
 Commercial enterprise by public authorities exercising monopoly power is a sensitive
issue. While the principles of their operations may be expressed clearly in policy
documents or legislation, the difficulty is in how to conduct business with private
enterprise in a way that permits transparency.
89 Siu-Ming Tam, Integrated Collection and Dissemination Division, ABS, ‘Informing the nation – open access to
statistical information in Australia’, United Nations Statistical Commission and Economic Commission for Europe,
WP.11, 18 March 2009, Conference of European Statisticians, UNECE Work Session on the Communication and
Dissemination of Statistics, 13-15 May, Warsaw Poland: Topic – To charge or not to charge: Fundraising, access
licenses and costing models –
information accessed at URL <http://www.unece.org/stats/documents/ece/ces/ge.45/2009/wp.11.e.pdf>
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 The Western Australian model may provide some impetus for innovation in the short
term; but it may be seen as crowding-out of private sector initiative if government
agencies commit public funds in expenditure that is ‘avoidable cost’ from a public point
of view.
1.8.1 Formation of the Western Australian Land Information System
(WALIS)
The Western Australian experience since the late 1970s mirrors that of a number of
Australian States in its problems of information retrieval, interdepartmental information
sharing and avoidance of unnecessary duplication in producing information. The
government formed the Western Australian Government Computing Policy Committee
(WAGCPC) under chairmanship of the Deputy Under-Treasurer in late 1978. In 1979,
WAGCPC commissioned PA Consultants to analyse requirements for a land information
system.90 The consultant’s report gave direction for the Western Australian Land
Information System (WALIS), which acquired its title in 1980. Its operations were overseen
by a Land Information System Advisory Committee to represent public and private sector
interests as expressed by Special Interest Groups (SIG).91 A  Land Information System
Support Centre (LISSC) became a hub of technology and skilled personnel in developing
WALIS.
Initially, WALIS concentrated on improving the property register and integration of existing
information pertaining to state and freehold lands. Additionally, the Special Interest Groups
initiated two pilot projects; and the results highlighted particular risks in attempting to
integrate corporate data.
With hindsight, the emphasis in the recommendations should have emphasised organisational
solutions rather than technical ones. Furthermore, senior management should have been better
engaged. These are commonly recurring themes in the WALIS story.92
In March 1984, the government established the Department of Computing and Information
Technology (DOCIT) to replace the former Government Computing Division of Treasury.
At the same time, the structure of the Land Information System Support Centre was
revised to reflect its increasingly demanding role as it grew into an actual provider of
information.
1.8.2 Formation of Department of Land Administration (DOLA)
Rapid growth in databases and subsystems led to a 1986 re-evaluation of WALIS goals
and strategies. A Functional Review Committee Report of October 1986 recommended
formation of a Department of Land Administration (DOLA). Following an Intergraph
Corporation review in late 1986, WALIS committee structure was rearranged in 1987 into a
WALIS Council, a WALIS Executive Policy Committee and a WALIS Secretariat.
Since its inception in 1981, WALIS served as the State’s primary spatial information
coordination body. It oversaw management of spatial information across the State
community. It captured and maintained fundamental spatial data sets through the State
90 Andrew Burke and Robin  Piesse, ‘A history of WALIS - a synopsis of the origins and evolution of the Western
Australian Land Information System’, c.2000, p.1, accessed at <http://www.walsi.wa.gov.au/about_WALIS/walsi-
history-to-2000.pdf> on 23 October 2007
91 ibid., pp.1-2
92 ibid., pp.1-2
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Land Information Capture Program, all of which comprise key elements of the WA
Geographic Data Infrastructure (GDI).
The departmental focus of WALIS left no one to develop the government-wide business
case for on-line access.
1.8.3 Pricing and transfer policy for spatial information
On 17 April 2000, the Cabinet of the Western Australian Government approved a pricing
and transfer policy for spatial information held by its government agencies.93 The April
2000 policy replaced a previous policy approved in February 1992.
These pricing policies were based on recommendations of a Treasury Pricing Review
carried out for the WALIS Executive Policy Committee. The diagram below provides an
overview that incorporates key elements of the Treasury’s analysis and recommendations.
The effect of this analysis was to produce three main outcomes involving supply at:
 Extraction and distribution price – which is effectively a marginal cost pricing approach
to pricing.
 Commercial pricing – where government agencies become monopoly suppliers.
 A contestable market approach.
A contestable market approach means that information must be supplied to private sector
firms engaged in value adding under the same conditions that apply to the government’s
own reuse of its own information for value adding purposes. This applies to reuse of
information held by an agency for value adding purposes as well as the supply of
93 Western Australian Government, Pricing and transfer policy for land and geographic information held by Western
Australian State Government agencies. Perth, WA: Western Australian Government, 2000
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information to other agencies. This condition meets a competition policy requirement for
competitive neutrality; albeit with some unresolved accounting issues concerning how a
marginal cost of particular information can actually be established.
1.8.4 Machinery of Government Taskforce 2001
Cabinet approved formation of a Machinery of Government Taskforce on 26 February
2001 as a starting point for a major structural reorganisation of the Western Australian
Government.94 The taskforce reported in June 2001. In retrospect, its findings and
recommendations seem to have been a significant influence on later commercialisation
and cost recovery initiatives.
The taskforce adopted a generic portfolio structure to recognise the responsible minister,
his or her portfolio, relevant department or departments, administrative offices,
commissions, and statutory authorities. It saw its challenge as developing a program to
enhance public sector service delivery without stalling Government operations during
implementation stages. It soon found an excessive number of overlapping Government
agencies.
The diverse and fragmented nature of the State’s public sector compromises its ability to deliver
services effectively and efficiently. Despite a range of expert and independent reviews, Western
Australia’s machinery of Government has continued to grow in a haphazard fashion, offering no
cohesive support for the delivery of Government priorities.95
The taskforce saw objections to statutory authorities where ‘their greater independence
could compromise appropriate accountability’. Moreover, they were seen as ‘inflexible,
cumbersome and unresponsive to changing administrative needs’.96 The following
recommendations 8 and 9 established parameters for the subsequent constitution of the
Western Australian Land Information Authority.97
Recommendation 8
A statutory authority should be established only if its proposed functions cannot be
performed by a department or it would be inappropriate for them to be performed by a
department.
Recommendation 9
The functions of each statutory authority in the Western Australian public sector should
be reviewed before 1 July 2002 to assess the appropriateness and feasibility of
incorporating those functions into departments of State. This review should be co-
ordinated by the Department of the Premier and Cabinet.
Recommendations 10 and 11 provide for some standardisation for reporting by statutory
authorities.
94 Ministry of the Premier and Cabinet, The Machinery of Government Taskforce, Stuart Hicks (Chair), Government
structures for better results: the report of the taskforce established to review the machinery of Western Australia’s
government. Perth WA: Western Australian Government, June 2001, p.3
accessed via URL <http://www.dpc.wa.gov.au/psmd/pubs/exec/machgovt/machgovt.html> on 17 January 2008
95 ibid., p.ii
96 ibid., p.iii
97 ibid., Recommendation 8 at p.iii
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Recommendation 10
To facilitate greater accountability for performance and to improve the delineation of
responsibility between Ministers and boards for policy and management respectively,
all Government business enterprises as well as the Government Employees
Superannuation Board should be required to develop Statements of Corporate Intent
and Strategic Development Plans and agree these documents with their Minister, the
Government Enterprises Minister and the Treasurer. Relevant Acts should be
amended to reflect this requirement.
Recommendation 11
All Government business enterprises should be reviewed with the objective of clarifying
commercial responsibilities, and where appropriate, establishing those commercial
responsibilities by statute. This review should be co-ordinated by the Department of the
Premier and Cabinet with the assistance of the Department of Treasury and Finance.
1.8.5 Reaction to Machinery of Government initiatives
Notwithstanding the Machinery of Government Taskforce report of June 2001, Cabinet
decided in principle in October 2002 to establish a new authority to perform a number of
land information functions. These functions included land titling, land information and land
valuation functions that were then performed by the Department of Land Administration.
They also included development of a common online platform for land information, and
commercial development of land information as an asset. A consultation paper sought
submissions before 30 May 2003.98
The 2002 Cabinet decision envisaged a dual role for the authority to undertake non-profit
and commercial activities as deemed appropriate.99 The 2003 discussion paper proposed
that pricing principles would be included within legislation constituting the authority.100 The
proposal envisaged a Board that was fully governing in determining policy and overseeing
operations rather than merely advisory in its functions.101 However, proposals for
generating and using public funds were to be accountable to parliament through controls
exercised by the relevant minister.102
Economic issues were obviously viewed as important - as indicated in commissioning a
2004 ACIL Tasman report to estimate the economic contribution of the Western Australian
Land Information System.103 The central question addressed by this study was a valuation
of the benefit stream provided by WALIS. The need for this valuation arose from the 2003
release of a WALIS Program Effectiveness Evaluation Project (PEP).104 ACIL Tasman
estimated that WALIS contributed around $15 million per year to the Western Australian
community.105
98 Department of Land Administration (DOLA), Consultation paper on the establishment of a land and property
information statutory authority, Executive summary, Perth WA: Western Australian Government, April 2003
99 ibid., p.iv
100 ibid., p.vi
101 ibid., p.ix
102 ibid., p.viii
103 ACIL Tasman, Value of the Western Australian Land Information System - an assessment of the value
contributed by WALIS to the WA Geographic Data Infrastructure, a report to the Western Australian Government
accessed at URL <www.walis.wa.gov.au/about_WALIS/assets/Value%20of%20WALIS%20final.pdf>
104 ibid., p.1
105 Department of Land Information Annual Report 2004/2005, p.79 accessed at
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The WALIS Advisory Committee produced a white paper on spatial data pricing in April
2006.106 This paper recommended that the WALIS Data Pricing and Transfer Policy be
reviewed and revised; but did not add any significant new knowledge to the debate.107
1.8.6 Formation of the Western Australian Land Information Authority
The Land Information Authority Act 2006 established the Western Australia Land
Information Authority as a statutory authority that came into being on 1 January 2007 and
trades as ‘Landgate’,108 The Act gives the Authority considerable discretion in
disseminating land information to meet social, economic and environmental goals. Section
8 gives dual objectives to the Authority’s overall financial management as follows:
It is intended that the Authority —
(a) act as a body through which the State performs certain functions related to land
information on a basis that does not involve making a profit; and
(b) in addition to acting as described in paragraph (a), generate for the State a fair
commercial return from providing goods and services on a basis that may involve making
a profit.
Section 10 in paras.1 to 3 provides further guiding principles:
(1) In performing its functions under this Act, the Authority has to —
(a) act in a cost effective manner; and
(b) act on prudent commercial principles.
(2) The Authority has to perform its functions under this Act in a way that supports the
sustainable economic, social, and environmental management and development of the State.
(3) In performing its functions under this Act, the Authority has to have regard to —
(a) the maintenance of the integrity of the registers and other records that it or a member of
its staff is required by law to keep about interests in land and the valuation of land; and
(b) the importance of satisfying the land information needs of the State government; and
(c) the requirements of participants in the land information industry within the State.
Part 5 sets out accountability and financial provisions. These provisions reflect a generic
influence of the 2001 report by the Machinery of Government Taskforce in requiring two
key documents – a strategic plan and a statement of corporate intent.109 Undoubtedly,
some standardisation of key elements of content in strategic plans and statements of
corporate intent makes budgeting and review processes easier when considering a
significant number of statutory authorities.
Section 53 of the Act requires regular production of two key documents:
 a strategic development plan involving forecasting for 5 years; and
106 Western Australian Land Information System Advisory Committee, WALIS Advisory Committee white paper:
Spatial data pricing - advice to the Western Australian Government, Perth WA: Western Australian Land
Information System (WALIS), 2006
accessed at URL <www.walis.wa.gov.au/policies/assets/WAC%20discussion%20paper.pdf>
107 ibid., p.1 of 10
108 Land Information Authority Act 2006 (WA), no.60 of 2006, assented 16 November 2006, Part 1 commenced on 17
November 2006, other Parts commenced on 1 January 2007 under proclamation in Gazette, 8 Dec 2006 p.5369
109 Machinery of Government Taskforce, Stuart Hicks (Chair), Government structures for better results,
recommendation 10 at p.iii compares with the Land Information Authority Act 2006 at ss.
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 a statement of corporate intent – to be negotiated between the Authority’s board of
management and the Minister each financial  year with the Treasurer’s concurrence.110
The Land Information Authority (Policy Instruments) Regulations 2006 are issued under
section 92 of the Act. Regulation 4 sets out detailed requirements for the statement of
corporate intent as follows:
4. Content of statement of corporate intent
Section 61(2) of the Act requires the Authority’s statement of corporate intent to include each of
the following matters —
(a) an outline of major initiatives for achieving strategic objectives;
(b) proposed arrangements to facilitate achievement of objectives that do not involve making a
profit;
(c) how major initiatives might impact on —
(i) the integrity of the registers and other records that the Authority or a member of its
staff is required by law to keep about interests in land and the valuation of land; or
(ii) the extent to which the land information needs of the State government can be
satisfied; or
(iii) the extent to which the requirements of participants in the land information industry
within the State can be satisfied;
(d) major achievements that are planned;
(e) an outline of capital expenditure and borrowing requirements;
(f) the nature and scope of functions that are to be performed;
(g) performance targets and measures;
(h) estimates of income and expenditure;
(i) the dividend policy for the financial year or the provision proposed to be made for dividends;
(j) the types of information that the Authority is to give to the Minister in an annual or half-yearly
report or otherwise;
(k) accounting policies that apply to the preparation of accounts;
(l) the nature and extent of community service obligations that are to be performed;
(m) how the performance of community service obligations is to be costed and funded, and
arrangements to be made to make adjustments for the performance of those obligations;
(n) the ways in which, and the extent to which, compensation will be made for performing
community service obligations.
Landgate is required to follow pricing principles as set out in the Land Information Authority
Act 2006 at Section 16. ‘Fundamental land’ is a key concept in interpreting Section 16. It is
defined in the Regulations made under the Act.111
 Section 16 does not apply to the charging of an amount that is fixed by a written law.112
 It generally requires a distinction to be made between commercial and non-commercial
use of information.
110 Land Information Authority Act 2006 (WA), ss.57-62
111 Land Information Authority Regulations 2007 (WA), regulation 3 - notified in Gazette, 21 December 2007 at
pp.6307-6316, regs. 1-2 commenced on 21 December 2007, other regs. commencing 22 December 2007;
‘fundamental land information’ referred to in the Act at s.16 and at reg.3
112 Land Information Authroity Act 2006, s.16(2)
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Section 16 states:
(1) This section fixes principles on the basis of which the Authority is to charge in certain
circumstances for goods or services —
(a) that it provides under this Act; or
(b) that any other written law requires to be charged for in accordance with this section.
(2) This section does not apply to the charging of an amount that is fixed by a written law.
(3) Unless subsection (4) or (6) applies or an arrangement described in subsection (7) provides
otherwise, charges that the Authority makes for providing goods or services for use for any
purpose that involves any commercial benefit being derived are to be designed to provide to
the Authority an overall profit representing a fair commercial return after covering the
Authority’s total costs related to the goods or services.
(4) A charge that the Authority makes for providing fundamental land information —
(a) to the State or a local government; or
(b) in accordance with an approval under subsection (9), for use for a purpose that does not
involve any commercial benefit being derived, is to be designed to cover the Authority’s
costs of extracting the information and providing it.
(5) The cost of extracting and providing fundamental land information, for the purposes of
subsection (4) —
(a) includes —
(i) the cost to the Authority of processing a request for information, extracting the
information, providing it in the format in which it is extracted, and performing
accounting related to the transaction; and
(ii) a proportion of the cost of accommodation, equipment, and other overheads required
to provide the service;
but
(b) does not include any of the cost of collecting or maintaining the information.
(6) A charge that the Authority makes for providing any goods or services, other than
fundamental land information —
(a) to the State or a local government; or
(b) in accordance with an approval under subsection (9), for use for a purpose that does not
involve any commercial benefit being derived, is to be designed to cover the Authority’s
total costs related to the goods or services.
(7) The Authority may charge a person for providing any goods or services on a basis that is
different from the basis described by the other provisions of this section if the charge is in
accordance with an arrangement agreed between the Authority and that person.
(8) A charge under an arrangement agreed under subsection (7) may involve the making of a
profit by the Authority.
(9) The Authority may approve of any goods or services being provided at a charge described in
subsection (4) or (6), as the case requires, if it is satisfied that the person to whom they are
provided —
(a) has functions of a public nature; and
(b) will not use them other than for the purposes of education, research, or activities of a
community or regional nature; and
(c) will comply with any conditions on which goods or services are provided at a charge as
described.
(10) In this section —
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“fundamental land information” means any land information that the regulations prescribe
as fundamental land information for the purposes of subsection (4).
Section 17 allows that certain information can be made free of charge in exceptional
circumstances.
(1) The Minister may, under section 65(1), direct the Authority to provide information of a class
identified in the direction free of charge.
(2) The direction may be expressed to apply only in a case of a class identified in the direction.
(3) The Minister may give a direction as described in subsection (1) even though it would require
the Authority to act contrary to the principles described in section 16, but this section does
not enable the Minister to require information to be provided free of a charge fixed by a
written law.
(4) Before giving a direction as described in subsection (1), the Minister has to consider the
impact, if any, that complying with the direction would have on the Authority’s ability to
achieve its objectives and targets outlined in its strategic development plan and its statement
of corporate intent, and the Minister may give the direction even though complying with it
may prevent, or significantly affect, achievement of any of those objectives and targets.
(5) The Minister cannot give a direction as described in subsection (1) unless —
(a) the Minister is satisfied that there is a public benefit sufficient to justify giving the
direction; and
(b) the direction is given with the Treasurer’s concurrence.
Part 5 sets out accountability and financial provisions. These provisions reflect a generic
influence of the 2001 report by the Machinery of Government Taskforce in requiring two
key documents – a strategic plan and a statement of corporate intent.113 Undoubtedly,
some standardisation of key elements of content in strategic plans and statements of
corporate intent makes budgeting and review processes easier when considering a
significant number of statutory authorities.
It refers in particular to two key documents:
 a strategic development plan involving forecasting for 5 years; and
 a statement of corporate intent -
Seemingly, the requirement for these documents derives from Section 53(2) The Act
authorises the making of regulations - the Land Information Authority (Policy Instruments)
Regulations 2006. The regulations set out
4. Content of statement of corporate intent
Section 61(2) of the Act requires the Authority’s statement of corporate intent to include each of the following
matters —
(a) an outline of major initiatives for achieving strategic objectives;
(b) proposed arrangements to facilitate achievement of objectives that do not involve making a profit;
(c) how major initiatives might impact on —
(iv)the integrity of the registers and other records that the Authority or a member of its staff is
required by law to keep about interests in land and the valuation of land; or
(v) the extent to which the land information needs of the State government can be satisfied; or
(vi)the extent to which the requirements of participants in the land information industry within the
State can be satisfied;
113 Machinery of Government Taskforce, Stuart Hicks (Chair), Government structures for better results,
recommendation 10 at p.iii compares with the Land Information Authority Act 2006 at ss.
34 TABLE OF CONTENTS - continued
(d) major achievements that are planned;
(e) an outline of capital expenditure and borrowing requirements;
(f) the nature and scope of functions that are to be performed;
(g) performance targets and measures;
(h) estimates of income and expenditure;
(i) the dividend policy for the financial year or the provision proposed to be made for dividends;
(j) the types of information that the Authority is to give to the Minister in an annual or half-yearly
report or otherwise;
(k) accounting policies that apply to the preparation of accounts;
(l) the nature and extent of community service obligations that are to be performed;
(m) how the performance of community service obligations is to be costed and funded, and
arrangements to be made to make adjustments for the performance of those obligations;
(n) the ways in which, and the extent to which, compensation will be made for performing community
service obligations.
1.8.7 Shared land information platform (slip) – pricing framework
The Shared Land Information Platform (SLIP) links datasets held by up to 15 government
agencies; and allows authorised users to view and extract information they require through
use of web based browsers. These technological and institutional arrangements provide a
basis for improving efficiencies within government and facilitating the development of
value-added products within the community.114 A February 2007 report to the Department
of Land Information developed a pricing framework to adapt the WALIS Pricing Policy to
changed circumstances. The particular needs included:
 meeting objectives and complying with provisions of the Land Information Authority Act
2006 (WA);
 establishing prices in a consistent, transparent and defensible manner;
 accounting for and charging for full costs of production to satisfy requirements for
competitive neutrality in contestable markets; and
 using the price mechanism to ration resources in the event of capacity constraints on
information supply through the Shared Land information Platform.115
1.8.8 WALIS Governance Framework
Key roles are those of
o The Minister - The Hon Michelle H Roberts BA DipEd MLA - Minister for Housing and
Works; Indigenous Affairs; Heritage; Land Information - Member for Midland –
responsible to the Parliament for administration of the Land Information Authority Act
2006 (WA)
o The Executive Policy Committee (EPC) – comprising Chief Executive Officers and
Directors General of eight WALIS member agencies that have custodianship
114 Allen Consulting Group, A pricing framework for the Shared Land Information Platform, Final Report to Western
Australian Department of Land Information, Perth WA, February 2007, p.1 accessed at
URL <http://www.walis.wa.gov.au/SLIP/Draft_Discussion_slip-pricing_070216.pdf>
115 ibid., pp.2-3
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responsibilities for the majority of the WA Government’s spatial datasets. Since October
2006, EPC has also been responsible for SLIP.116
o WALIS Spatial Management Group (SMG) – replaces the former SLIP Executive
Committee and the WALIS Core Management Group to facilitate executive functions of
implementing policies and overseeing day-to-day activities. Responsibilities are mainly
to the EPC.117
o WALIS Advisory Committee (WAC) - The WALIS Advisory Committee (WAC) consists
of representatives from industry, community, education and local government. WAC’s
purpose is to provide the WALIS Executive Policy Committee (EPC) and WALIS Spatial
Management Group (SMG) with strategic advice to stimulate and encourage promotion
and support for the development and use of geographic information within Western
Australia.118 This would position WAC in a key role of research and development and
orientation towards the future.
o WALIS Council - comprising representatives from each of the WALIS member
agencies – focuses on operational coordination and information exchange; provides
professional advice on technical issues; and manages stakeholder relationships.119
The following diagram is copied from the WALIS website and gives an overview of
organisational structure.
116 EPC members are Chief Executive Officers and Directors General of Landgate, the Department for Planning and
Infrastructure, the Department of Agriculture and Food, the Department of Industry and Resources, the Fire and
Emergency Services Authority, the Department of Environment and Conservation, the Department of Premier and
Cabinet, and the Department of Water –
Information accessed at URL <http://www.walis.wa.gov.au/walis_committees/walis-executive-policy-committee>
117 Summarised from URL <http://www.walis.wa.gov.au/walis_committees/walis-spatial-management-group>
118 Summarised from URL <http://www.walis.wa.gov.au/walis_committees/advisory>
119 Information accessed at URL <http://www.walis.wa.gov.au/walis_committees/walis-council>
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2 NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT
2.1 NEW ZEALAND PUBLIC SECTOR CHARGES – 2002
New Zealand has a unicameral legislature situated in Wellington and is able to avoid some
of the complexity of Australia’s federal system of government. In 1983, Australia and New
Zealand entered into a closer economic relations agreement that promotes cooperation
with Australia in many areas affecting technical standards and public policies.120
The government formed Land Information New Zealand (LINZ) in 1996 as an authority to
manage selected functions previously performed by the Department of Survey and Land
Information (DOSLI); the Land Titles Office (LTO); and the Office of the Valuer General.
The balance of DOSLI became a government owned enterprise known as Terralink NZ.
This entity was privatised in June 2001 to form Terralink International that now trades
internationally. Seemingly, these arrangements now separate noncontestable areas of
government spatial information activity into LINZ; and former contestable areas occupied
by DOSLI into the competitive space occupied by Terralink International and other private
sector firms.121
In 2002, the New Zealand Treasury published Guidelines for setting charges in the public
sector.122
120 New Zealand Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Australia and New Zealand Closer Economic Relations’,
agreement entered into force on 1 January 1983, accessed at
121 Renate Mason, ‘Developing Australian spatial data policies - existing practices and future strategies’, A thesis
submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of New South Wales,
2000, pp.8-9 & 30-31, accessed at URL <http://www.library.unsw.edu.au/~thesis/adt-NUN/uploads/approved/adt-
NUN20021106.165932/public/01front.pdf> on 14 January 2008
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3 APPENDIX A – SUMMARIES OF RECOMMENDATIONS
FROM AND COMMENTARY ON DATA PRICING REPORTS
The purpose is to consolidate and comment upon recommendations and government
responses Reports made independently
Chapter 3 - Legal and fiscal framework
Recommendation 3.1
All cost recovery arrangements should have clear legal authority. Agencies should
identify the most appropriate authority for their charges and ensure that fees-for-
service are not vulnerable to challenge as amounting to taxation.
Government response
The Government agrees that cost recovery arrangements should have clear legal
authority.
The Government notes that there are no specific problems identified with current cost
recovery arrangements.
Recommendation 3.2
Revenue from the Commonwealth’s cost recovery arrangements should be identified
separately in budget documentation and in the Consolidated Financial Statements. It
should also be identified separately in each agency’s Annual Report and in Portfolio
Budget Statements.
Government response
The Government agrees that separate identification of cost recovery receipts will
increase transparency of the revenue obtained from cost recovery arrangements.
Chapter 4 - Current cost recovery arrangements
Recommendation 4.1
The Commonwealth Government should adopt a formal cost recovery policy for
agencies undertaking regulatory and information activities. This policy should
implement the cost recovery Guidelines recommended by this inquiry.
Government response
The Government agrees that there should be a formal cost recovery policy for
government agencies, and that part of that policy shall be a set of guidelines for
appropriate cost recovery processes.
The Government will finalise the guidelines as part of the Government’s final response
to the report, with the preparation involving consultation with all affected agencies.
In the interests of reducing complexity, this summary excludes recommendations 6.1 and
6.2 that pertain to cost recovery of user charges made under the Trade Practices Act
1974.
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Chapter 7 - Improving the design of cost recovery
Recommendation 7.1
Cost recovery arrangements that are not justified on grounds of economic efficiency should not be
undertaken solely to raise revenue for Government activities.
Government response
Agreed in principle. The Government considers that cost recovery arrangements should have sound
economic underpinnings and should not be undertaken solely to raise revenue for Government
activities. The Government considers that one-off measures to address specific and exceptional
policy needs fall outside the scope of the cost recovery policy.
Recommendation 7.2
Cost recovery arrangements should apply to specific activities or products, and not to the agency as
a whole.
Government response
Agreed. Cost recovery should be undertaken on an activity basis or, where it is efficient to do so,
applied to groups of activities with similar characteristics or objectives. Cost recovery arrangements
should, as a matter of principle, be considered on an activity basis rather than as broadly applying
to the agency as a whole.
Recommendation 7.3
Cost recovery of activities should exclude those undertaken for the Government (such as policy
development, and Ministerial or Parliamentary services), or to comply with certain international
obligations.
Government response
Agreed in part. Where functions undertaken for Government (such as the development of policy for
Government and Ministerial/Parliamentary servicing functions) are directly linked to service and
product delivery, they are validly considered to be integral to the costs of the activity and should
appropriately be included in agency charging. However, the Government agrees that, where the link
cannot be well evidenced, such functions should not be cost recovered. Similarly, international
activities that are relevant and integral to the ongoing regulatory or information activities of agencies
should continue to be considered in the design of cost recovery arrangements (for example, some
international regulatory standards conformance). However, where activities are undertaken to
comply with certain international obligations that arise as a result of general Government policy, the
Government agrees that, in general, they should not be cost recovered.
Recommendation 7.4
The practice of the Government setting targets that require agencies to recover a specific proportion
of total agency costs should be discontinued.
Government response
Agreed. Consistent with the Government’s response to Recommendation 7.2, the Government
agrees that the practice of setting agency cost recovery targets should be discontinued; cost
recovery arrangements should apply to specific activities or products, and not the agency as a
whole. The Government notes that internal targets for private contributions may still be set for
agencies that seek private funding for their work outside a cost recovery context.

Recommendation 7.5
Agencies and the Government together should define a basic information product set. This should
be a dynamic process, with basic information products determined by reference to:
 ‘public good’ characteristics;
 significant positive spillovers; and
 other Government policy reasons.
Government response
Agreed. The Government agrees that basic information products that are either substantially ‘public
good’ in nature and/or have significant positive spillovers, and are not inconsistent with the
Government’s policy goals should form the basic information product set.
Recommendation 7.6
The basic information product set of agencies should be funded from general taxation revenue.
Government response
Agreed in principle. Where the Government has agreed with the basic information product set, as
determined according to the characteristics outlined in Recommendation 7.5, the Government will
fund the collection and collation of information and reasonable means of dissemination from general
taxation revenue. Determining the basic information product set and the relevant funding by
Government will be negotiated in the normal course of the Budget process.
Recommendation 7.7
As a general principle, the costs of providing information products that are additional to the basic
product set should be recovered. However, cost recovery should not be implemented where:
 it is not cost effective;
 it would be inconsistent with policy objectives; or
 it would unduly stifle competition and industry innovation.
Government response
Agreed. The Government recognises that this recommendation is broadly consistent with the
approach currently adopted by most Government information agencies. The Government agrees
that cost recovery should not be undertaken where it is not cost effective, would be inconsistent with
other Government policy objectives, or would unduly stifle competition and industry innovation.
Recommendation 7.8
Additional information products should be classified into three broad categories and priced
accordingly:
 dissemination of existing products at marginal cost;
 incremental products (which may involve additional data collection or compilation) at
incremental (avoidable) cost; and
 commercial (contestable) products according to competitive neutrality principles.
Government response
Agreed. The Government recognises that this recommendation is broadly consistent with the
approach currently adopted by most Government information agencies and agrees that additional
information products should be classified into the three broad categories listed by the Commission
and priced accordingly. WHERE A PRODUCT IS INCREMENTAL TO THE BASIC PRODUCT SET,
AGENCIES SHOULD CONSIDER ADOPTING AN AVOIDABLE COST MODEL TO BETTER
REFLECT THE TRUE INCREMENTAL COST OF PROVIDING THE PRODUCT. PRODUCTS
THAT ARE TO BE DISSEMINATED BEYOND THE MEANS AGREED BY GOVERNMENT ARE TO
BE PRICED USING MARGINAL COSTS. IN INSTANCES IN WHICH A GOVERNMENT
BUSINESS ACTIVITY IS SUBJECT TO EXISTING COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLES,
THE DISCIPLINES OF COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY WILL BE APPLIED IN PREFERENCE TO
COST RECOVERY PRINCIPLES.
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Recommendation 7.9
As a general principle, the administrative costs of regulation should be recovered, so that the price
of each regulated product incorporates the cost of efficient regulation. Cost recovery should not be
implemented where:
 it is not cost effective;
 it would be inconsistent with policy objectives; or
 it would unduly stifle competition and industry innovation.
Government response
Cost recovery charges should be linked as closely as possible to the costs of activities or products.
Fees-for-service reflecting efficient costs should be used wherever possible. Where this is not
possible, specific taxation measures (such as levies) may be appropriate but only where the basis
of collection is closely linked to the costs involved.
Recommendation 7.10
Cost recovery charges should be linked as closely as possible to the costs of activities or products.
Fees-for-service reflecting efficient costs should be used wherever possible. Where this is not
possible, specific taxation measures (such as levies) may be appropriate but only where the basis
of collection is closely linked to the costs involved.
Government response
Agreed. The Government agrees that charges for products and services should, as closely as
possible, reflect the costs of providing the products/service; efficient costs should be used where
possible. Where relevant, these costs should include operational/administrative costs and other
costs integral to the activity. The Government agrees that, as a general principle, fees-for-service
should be used wherever possible, as they clearly evidence the nexus between the cost and the
provision of the activity. The Government notes that in some instances it may be appropriate for
entities to introduce levies rather than a fee for service.
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Chapter 8 - Improving agency efficiency
Recommendation 8.1
Agencies should not have automatic access to cost recovery revenue from compulsory regulatory
activities. Funding for these activities should be subject to the same budgetary and Parliamentary
scrutiny as activities funded from general taxation revenue.
Government response
Agreed in principle. The Government notes this recommendation aims to improve the transparency
and accountability of regulatory agencies with cost recovery arrangements. The Government has
agreed, in its response to Recommendation 3.2, that agencies will separately identify revenues from
cost recovery activities in budgetary documentation and annual reports. The Government considers
that this provision will allow for increased parliamentary and budgetary scrutiny of all cost recovery
arrangements. The Government agrees with the principle that regulatory entities should not have
the capacity to extend the scope of regulatory activities without this being subject to Ministerial and
Parliamentary scrutiny. The Government adopts a range of financial mechanisms to ensure efficient
and responsive Government operations. Such arrangements should be subject to similar levels of
Government scrutiny and transparency as activities funded from general taxation.
Recommendation 8.2
Agencies with significant cost recovery arrangements should have adequate mechanisms in place
to promote meaningful consultation with stakeholders. Consultative committees should include the
following characteristics:
 stakeholder representation;
 a chairperson independent of the agency;
 ability to monitor agency efficiency;
 access to adequate information on agency processes and costs; and
 transparent reporting processes.
Government response
Agreed in part. The Government agrees that all significant cost recovery arrangements should have
appropriate mechanisms to promote consultation with stakeholders. Where stakeholder consultation
mechanisms exist, these could consider cost recovery arrangements. In a devolved governance
framework the Government does not consider it appropriate to mandate that consultative
committees be established. However, the characteristics of consultative committees outlined in the
Government’s guidelines may be a useful guide for agencies.
Recommendation 8.3
All existing, new and amended cost recovery arrangements of a significant nature should be
assessed against the Guidelines recommended by this inquiry. All significant cost recovery
arrangements should then be subject to periodic review, at least every ten years.
Government response
Agreed in part. The Government agrees that all new and substantially amended significant cost
recovery arrangements should be assessed against the Government’s cost recovery guidelines. For
existing significant cost recovery arrangements, the Government considers a five year review
schedule is appropriate. Where possible, cost recovery arrangements should be reviewed in
conjunction with other relevant agency reviews. These reviews shall form part of the normal Budget
process. The Government agrees that after initial review, all significant cost recovery arrangements
should be subject to periodic review, as a matter of best practice policy review, by Government
agencies, at least every five years. The Government is issuing cost recovery guidelines based on
those recommended by the Productivity Commission and reflecting the cost recovery policy as part
of this response.
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Chapter 8 - Improving agency efficiency (continued)
Recommendation 8.4
The Regulation Impact Statement process should be clarified to make it explicit that, where a
regulation under review includes a significant cost recovery element, the Regulation Impact
Statement should apply the Guidelines recommended by this inquiry.
Government response
Agreed in part. Where a Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) is required for a new policy proposal,
and the proposal includes a significant cost recovery element, the RIS should apply the
Government’s cost recovery guidelines. If significant cost recovery arrangements are not fully
assessed against the guidelines at the point a RIS is completed, these arrangements should be
assessed against the guidelines prior to implementation. The Government will amend the RIS
guidelines to include consideration of cost recovery arrangements in line with the Government’s
cost recovery policy.
Recommendation 8.5
A Cost Recovery Impact Statement process should be applied to all significant cost recovery
arrangements not covered by a Regulation Impact Statement. These include:
 existing cost recovery arrangements;
 new cost recovery proposals for regulations that affect individuals, not businesses;
 new cost recovery proposals of information agencies; and
 periodic reviews.
Government response
Agreed in principle. Subject to the Government’s response to Recommendation 8.4, all significant
cost recovery arrangements not covered by a RIS should address, where appropriate, issues
outlined in the cost recovery guidelines through a Cost Recovery Impact Statement (CRIS). The
Government considers the preparation of a CRIS to be a matter of good policy practice. Existing
significant cost recovery arrangements will be reviewed and CRIS’s will be prepared to ensure they
comply with the Government’s cost recovery policy. This review process will take place over five
years (see the Government’s response to Recommendation 9.1).
Recommendation 8.6
An independent review body should be appointed to assess whether Cost Recovery Impact
Statements adequately address the cost recovery Guidelines.
Government response
Not agreed. The Government does not accept the need for an independent review body to be
appointed to assess CRISs. The Government considers that the increased transparency and
accountability established by its cost recovery policy shall provide sufficient mechanisms for review.
All new significant cost recovery proposals will be reviewed by the Government as part of the
Budgetary cycle. Existing significant cost recovery arrangements will be reviewed against the
guidelines over five years and the findings of these reviews will be considered in the Budget
context.
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Chapter 8 - Improving agency efficiency (continued)
Recommendation 8.7
Agencies that cost recover should publish Cost Recovery Impact Statements and the assessment of
the independent review body on their websites and include a summary in their Annual Reports. Cost
Recovery Impact Statements should also be made available to Parliament through tabling or
publication in Portfolio Budget Statements.
Government response
Agreed in part. Agencies should include a summary of their CRIS in their Portfolio Budget
Statements and should consider publishing them on their websites. Consistent with the
Government’s response to Recommendations 3.2 and 8.6, the Government has agreed to increase
the transparency of reporting of cost recovery revenues in portfolio budget statements and annual
reports. Similarly, the results of any reviews of significant cost recovery arrangements should be
included in portfolio budget statements.
Chapter 9 - Implementation
Recommendation 9.1
All existing significant cost recovery arrangements should be reviewed against the Guidelines within
five years. The Department of Finance and Administration should prepare a review schedule.
Government response
The Government agrees that there is merit in existing cost recovery arrangements being reviewed
over time.
The Department of Finance and Administration will prepare a review schedule in consultation with
agencies, with reviews to be incorporated into other review processes (including output pricing
reviews) where possible.
